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Abstract
Given the structural differences in banking sector and financial regulation
at national level in EMU, this paper tries to estimate the banking sector risk
behavior at country level. Based on contingent claim literature, it computes
“Distance-to-default (DtD)” at bank level and analyses the aggregate series
at country level for a representative set of banks over the period 2004-Q4 to
2013-Q2. The indices provide an intuitive, forward-looking and timely risk
measure having strong correlations with national/regional market sentiment
indicators. An underlying trend exists but causality tests suggest no systemic
component. Cross-sectional differences in DtD suggests fragility in EMU
countries 12-18 months prior to the crisis and better predictive ability than
the regulatory index based on large and complex banking institutions at
European level. Furthermore, we explore the reasons for this divergence
using VAR estimates.
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1. Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt
crisis have exacerbated the need to understand and monitor the bank risk
behavior. Renewed attention is being focused at the global scale to enhance
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and extend risk measurement methodologies. The eurozone is no exception
and the twin objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) - price and
financial system stability - places a strong emphasis on Systemically Impor-
tant Financial Institutions (SIFI) but relies on individual countries’ central
banks to supervise smaller financial institutions.
This paper deviates from this current and in our view excessive focus and
attention on detecting and monitoring risk at European banking level. We
take a step backward and introduce a micro approach to document and mon-
itor the buildup of banking sector risk at country level. Based on contingent
claims literature, we calculate “Distance-to-default (DtD)”at bank level and
analyze the aggregate series at country level for a representative set of banks
over the period 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. Conceivably, if regulators pay greater
attention to country-specific buildups of risk and their connectedness, they
might take actions earlier to mitigate the extent and impact of future crisis.
There are many reasons for this choice. First, the structure of the bank-
ing sector within EMU countries varies considerably. In the case of Ger-
many, Finland and the Netherlands, total banking assets are relatively con-
centrated, while in Italy, Greece, France and Austria, they are distributed
quite equitably. Figure 1 summarizes this information by plotting the relative
size of banking firms (by total assets in 2010) in individual EMU countries,
where the total asset of the biggest banking firm in a particular country is
normalized to one. Excessive asset concentration lowers regulatory cost but
makes countries vulnerable to the actions of individual institutions.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Second, countries economic dependence on the banking sector varies dras-
tically.1 Consider the case of Luxembourg, where the total financial assets
under management is roughly 25 times the GDP2 while, in Greece, Italy and
Finland, this multiple is less than three (Figure 2). In some countries, all
financial services are provided by banks, while in others there are specialized
mortgage, pension and insurance companies. Given the existence of deposit
insurance at the national level, governments implicitly or explicitly guar-
antee bank deposits; which in times of stress, can transfer huge contingent
1We consider total asset managed by banking firms as a proxy for relative economic
dependence.
2Gross Domestic Product (at current prices).
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liabilities onto sovereign’s balance sheets and bailing out may lead to the
weakening of government’s own position.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Third, the excessive home bias in European banks’ asset portfolios (Figure
3) creates a vicious circle for risk transfer between banks and sovereigns,
which creates perverse economic and political incentives for government to
save domestic banks. The existence of financial regulation at national level
provides governments with the means to pursue their own national interests.
“The Financial Trilemma”noted by Schoenmaker (2013, xi) apply aptly to
the current crisis in the euro area context.3 Neighborhood effects, close
connectedness with certain countries and cross country differences in bailout
strategy also indicate a need for monitoring bank risk at country level.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Given this background, the main objective of this paper is to document
the evolution of country wise DtD indices. The central questions addressed
here are:
• Does this risk measure provide useful information on the buildup of
risk in the banking sector?;
• Does it render utile insights into market sentiments?; and
• Can it perform better than regulatory measure of prudential risk?
As it turns out, nationalDtDs are simple, convenient and intuitive forward-
looking risk measures. The level of DtD differentiates countries based on
the structural differences in their financial sectors. It shows strong correla-
tions with indicators of national and regional market sentiment and performs
better than aggregate index based on SIFI at European level. Our results
indicate that causal relationships run from national DtDs to Euro wide ag-
gregate indicators. To test the improved informational content and reasons
for divergence, we explore the cross sectional linkages and dependence using
correlation, connectedness and causality measures.
3“financial stability and national policies for supervision and resolution cannot be com-
bined in an open economy with international banks”
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This paper contributes to the literature in several ways: (1) we use a
novel bottom-up approach to understanding systemic risk buildup in the
banking sector and risk-shifting behavior in EMU countries; (2) we use one
of the most comprehensive representative databases for the EMU financial
sector; (3) we do not neglect the banking sector of smaller countries, which
may not be relevant at EMU level but will be relevant at country level; and
(4) to our knowledge, this is the first paper which tries to establish a link
between country-specific buildup of financial risk with euro-wide aggregate
risk indicators and national and regional market sentiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior
literature that used different frameworks to understand bank fragility and
justifies our selection of DtD as banking risk indicator. Section 3 describes
the sample data used to construct, analyze and calibrate the individual and
aggregate DtD series. Section 4 first documents the behavior of returns,
volatility and DtD for each EMU country; it then analyses these behaviors
jointly and presents some cross-sectional econometric analysis to gauge the
relative predictive ability of the country-specific DtD indicators. Section 5
tests the additional information content of DtD indices at EMU level while
section 6 explores the reason for divergence among bank risk behavior using
different connectedness measures. Section 7 draws conclusions.
2. Choice of risk indicator
Based on the survey of the existing measures of bank risk, we employed
three basic criteria for indicator selection. It should: (1) identify the exist-
ing balance sheet fragility; (2) incorporate uncertainty using forward look-
ing market measure; and (3) provide quantifiable risk indicators to measure
risk exposures (Gapen et al. (2005)). A comprehensive survey suggest that
most of bank risk indicators can be classified into two broad categories: (1)
pure market based; and (2) pure balance sheet based ratios. However the
consensus on the accuracy and stress prediction ability of these indicators
is relatively low (see Altman and Katz (1976); Kaplan and Urwitz (1979);
Blume et al. (1998) among others).
These models have generally been criticized on three grounds: (1) the
absence of a underlying theoretical model; (2) the timeliness of the infor-
mation4 and (3) the lack of uncertainty or a forward-looking component.
4These models use information from financial statements which are based on past per-
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These methodologies also introduce sample selection bias, generating incon-
sistent coefficient estimates (e.g., Shumway (2001); Chava and Jarrow (2004);
Thomas et al. (2012)).
The contingent claims model of Merton (1974) answers some of these
criticisms. The basic model is based on the priority structure of balance
sheet liabilities and uses the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula
to value the junior claims as call option on firms’ value with the value of senior
claims as default barrier. It provides a structural underpinning and combines
market-based and accounting information to obtain a comprehensive set of
company financial risk indicators, e.g: DtD, probabilities of default, credit
spreads, etc.
Additionally, this measure captures the current period instability (using
volatility), a forward-looking component (using stock prices) and balance
sheet mismatch (using capital structure), in accordance with our require-
ments. It has been widely applied to assess the ability of corporates, banks
and sovereigns to service their debt. Banking applications follow CCA by
interpreting a bank’s equity as a call option on its value given the limited
liability of shareholders. This approach was further refined by Vasicek (1984)
and Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is applied professionally in Moody’s KMV
to predict default.
The DtD approach has been widely cited and reviewed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB) and Office of
Federal Research (OFR) as a tool for enhancing banking sector risk analy-
sis. A number of applications of this approach have been studied to analyze
different dimensions of risk. Several papers have examined the usefulness of
DtD as a tool for predicting corporate and bank failure (Kealhofer (2003);
Oderda et al. (2003); Vassalou and Yuhang (2004); Gropp et al. (2006);
Harada et al. (2010); Thomas et al. (2012)). They have found DtD to be a
powerful measure to predict bankruptcy and rating downgrades.
In parallel, comparative analysis of accounting based measures and DtD
(Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008)), suggests that DtD
can be a powerful proxy to determine default. Campbell et al. (2008) and
Bharath and Shumway (2008) incorporate a hazard modeling approach using
both accounting and market variables in their estimation; they find that the
formance and are available only at a quarterly or an annual frequency; thus, they fail to
capture changes in the financial conditions of the borrowing firm.
5
DtD measure has relatively little explanatory power when they include other
variables in their models. Campbell et al. (2011) identify an alternative set
of market measures such as price levels, volatility of returns, equity to book
ratio and profitability that enhance the predictive power of the models to
match real world probabilities of default.
Note that here we don’t intend to improve the existing risk measurement
methodologies or aggregation techniques (like CoVaR, SRISK etc.) but aim
to use them more effectively in order to capture the existing fragility. This
approach will help supplement the existing methodologies that failed to cap-
ture vulnerabilities prior to this crisis.
In practice, the extension of DtD series as a system wide indicator has
two major difficulties: (1) how can individual banks’ data be aggregated as
a system-wide representation?; and (2) at what level should they be aggre-
gated? We follow Harada and Ito (2008) and Harada et al. (2010) which
provided empirical evidence of the usefulness of DtD to detect bank default
risks. The systemic risk indicator in this case was an average of individual
DtD series of “sound” banks. This approach offers relative risk measures
and is very attractive in terms of policy advice. However, this aggregation
method ignores the joint distribution properties. In Gray et al. (2007), Gray
and Jobst (2010), Duggar and Mitra (2007), Gray et al. (2010) and Gray
and Jobst (2013)), the authors provide further extensions to incorporate
inter-linkages using rolling correlations or extreme value theory and develop
extensions to analyze a wide range of macro-financial issues. This paper will
remain silent on these issues. Instead, we will try to investigate the linkages
based on the aggregate DtD indicators.
In recent literature, Gray and Malone (2008) and Saldias (2013) have
argued that option based implied volatility can improve the performance of
DtD and overcome some of the shortcomings caused by the assumptions
about return distributions. Given that we want to discriminate between the
banking structures in EMU countries, we will shy away from using index
volatility. Instead, we will construct our own measure of volatility based on
historical returns series for each country. This ignores information based on
index options (future correlations and skews) but is more appropriate for our
analysis.
2.1. Calculation method
The foundation for this model lies with the structural model of default
developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Since equity is
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a junior claim to debt, it can be modeled and calculated as a standard call
option on the assets with exercise price equal to the value of risky debt (also
known in the literature as distress barrier or default barrier).
The model uses no arbitrage conditions and assumes a frictionless market.
The stochastic process generating the firm’s assets return are described by
the diffusion process with a constant variance per unit time (σA). Following
standard literature, we assume that financial distress and bankruptcy are
costless.5 A firm has a simple capital structure with N shares of common
stock with market capital E and zero coupon bonds with a face value of D
with time to maturity T . The estimation methodology is as follows.
We use the value conservation equation:
A = E +D (1)
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian
Motion, the application of the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula
(Black and Scholes (1973)) yields the closed-form expression:
E = AN(d1)− e−rTDN(d2) (2)
where r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality, and N(∗) is the cumu-









d2 = d1 − σA
√
T (4)
The Merton model uses an additional equation that links the asset volatil-





The Merton model uses Eqs. 2 and 5 to obtain the implied asset value
A and volatility σA, which are not observable and must be estimated by
inverting the two relationships. Once numerical solutions for A and σA are
found, the T periods ahead DtD is calculated as:








The data selection methodology is as follows: First, an exhaustive list
of all listed and delisted monetary financial institutions is selected from
Bankscope database.6 We obtain a total of 199 firms in western Europe.
Secondly, only firms whose shares were publicly listed and traded between
the last quarter of 2004 till the second quarter of 2013 and are headquar-
tered in EMU countries are selected. Third, credit institutions which are
pure-play insurance, pension or mortgage banks are removed. The major
reason for this exclusion is the difference in liability structure and business
model compared to banks. However it doesn’t mean that they are less risky
to the financial system. To formalize this decision, we use Datastream as an
additional source of information.
Firms which were listed, delisted, nationalized or suffered any other rel-
evant corporate actions are considered in the data set until they stopped
trading on public exchanges. This choice also ensures that the selected banks
share the same accounting currency. However, it does not mean that they
have a similar exchange rate risk profile, since the level of foreign currency
exposure will depend on their respective asset profiles. The market-based
data include daily observations of risk-free interest rates, daily stock price
and total outstanding share in public. The risk free interest rates are 10-year
government bond yields in each banks country of origin. The list of variables
and data sources used for the above analysis are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
Figure 4 summarizes graphically the number of banks considered for the
analysis in each country at different time intervals. One should note that
due to the varying number of bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, na-
tionalization or other corporate actions, the number of firms in the sample
will change year-on-year, both for the full sample and for each individual
6It provides a comprehensive balance sheet data for financial companies.
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country. The comprehensive list of firms used in this analysis is summarized
in Table ??.7 This comprehensive list of firms represents one of the best
references for the EMU banking sector.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
3.2. Computation of individual DtD
DtD is not measured directly; it is recovered implicitly from the observed
measures of bank liabilities and of the market prices of those liabilities. In-
dividual DtD series have quarterly frequency. In practical terms, this means
that the balance sheet information has to be modified from its original quar-
terly, half-yearly or, in few cases, yearly frequencies. In this paper, the
original data were interpolated into quarterly series using cubic splines. Also
the real debt contracts are not all written with a single terminal date. To
overcome this problem, a common procedure used by Moody’s KMV and
also employed here, is to adopt a one year horizon (T = 1), but to weight
longer term debt of maturity greater than one year at only 50% of face value.
So in the second step, debt barriers (the face value of short-term liabilities
plus half of that of long-term liabilities) are computed using these new series
of quarterly balance sheet items.
The last step before computing the quarterlyDtD series is to calculate the
market value of firms’ equity and volatility. We use the average quarterly
historical volatilities based on log-return of equity prices. The individual
DtD is then calibrated by solving the nonlinear system of equations (2 and
5) and substituting the value of firm and asset volatility in equation (6).
3.2.1. Interpreting DtD across firms
DtD can be interpreted as how many standard deviations the asset value
of the firm is away from the debt of the firm. The standardisation by both
the size of the firm and volatility of the firm value means that the DtD can
be used to rank firms in terms of their credit quality. Thus, even when data
on actual defaults or bankruptcies are not readily observed, the DtD retains
its usefulness as a relative measure of credit worthiness of firms in a given
7The period for which each firm was traded is also available but is not presented here
in order to save space. This information is available from the authors upon request.
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sample. At any given point in time, across firms in a sample, the closer DtD
of a firm is to zero, the closer the firm is to default compared to firms whose
DtD values are further from zero.
3.2.2. Interpreting DtD across input variable characteristics
Three key inputs to calculating the DtD for a firm are market capitaliza-
tion, debt, and the volatility of equity. This implies that the DtD is infuenced
by the leverage - ratio of debt to the sum of equity and debt - and volatility of
the firm. A higher value of DtD can be obtained either because the leverage
of the firm is low or because the volatility is low or both.
In this section, we evaluate the sensitivity of DtD to each of these in-
puts by drawing Iso-DtD curves, across varying levels of leverage and equity
volatility. We plot Iso-DtD curves for nine different values of DtD in Fig-
ure 5. The graph shows that at a fixed level of volatility and low levels
of leverage, DtD changes are small and insignificant for changes in leverage.
DtD only starts changing (dropping towards zero) significantly only for much
higher levels of leverage (beyond 80 percent). For a constant level of leverage,
DtD shows much sharper drops for changes in equity volatility. This implies
that more than leverage, it is equity volatility that has a greater influence in
driving large changes in DtD.
[Figure 5 about here.]
This has some interesting implications for interpreting and using the mar-
ket based DtD as a measure of credit quality. When overall market volatility
is high, it is likely that even small changes in the leverage will cause large
changes in the DtD. Thus, in episodes such as the financial crisis of 2008,
when systemic volatility reached peak levels, the market reacted much more
strongly to even small changes in leverage. Whereas these same changes in
leverage during systemically calm periods would have generated smaller de-
creases in DtDs. Thus, the interpretation of changes in DtDs have different
implications on changes in firm credit quality during periods of high and low
volatility.
3.3. Aggregating DtD series
Once individual banks’ DtD are calculated, we aggregate the indicators
at country level. Following Harada et al. (2010), we consider the banking
risk indicators as the simple average of individual DtD series of all banks
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headquartered in a particular country. The simple average DtD for country





where DtDj,t is the individual DtD for firm j at time t .
To test the robustness of our results, we also did the analysis based on
banks’ market capital (total asset) weighted average DtD (wDtDi,t) risk in-






where DtDj,t is the individual DtD for firm j and wj is the weight based
on market capital (total asset) of firm j at time t. The evolution of all
these indicators is quite similar. However, given the structure of the banking
sector in individual EMU countries, aDtD seems to capture the general trend
and fluctuation better and avoids sudden jumps due to the bankruptcy (or
nationalization) of a particular firm with excessive weight. This is why our
analysis will focus on the aDtD indicator.
4. Analysis
To visualize the country-wise banking risk behavior, we plot the aDtD
for individual EMU countries (Figure 6). As can be seen, the level of aDtD
(Table 3) differs considerably across countries. Though these series together
show a trend, the variability across time is high. The pre-crisis level of aDtD
is relatively low for Austria, Greece and Netherlands, while Ireland, Portugal
and Belgium show a huge drop in levels during crisis period.
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
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4.1. As potential indicator
As banking stress indicators, we compare the evolution of aDtD with
banking sector equity and volatility indices.8 Figure 7 plots aDtD, bank
equity index and volatility for each EMU country separately. The left axis
represents the equity index level while the right axis represents the annualized
volatility in percentage. The level of aDtD is scaled to show the general trend
and variation with time. The graphs suggest that aDtD started deteriorating
for most countries between 2006-07, except for France and the Netherlands.
Notably, it started declining when bank index level showed an upward trend
while volatility was quite stable.9
[Figure 7 about here.]
The returns level suggests that the bank equity prices have fallen sub-
stantially for all countries. The first period of rapid decline started around
mid 2007, though some recovery was seen in 2009. The second period of
decline started during the sovereign debt crisis at the end of 2009, and still
continues for some countries. For almost half of the sample, the index level
at the end of 2012 is below the index value at the end of 2004. Greece,
Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Italy witnessed the highest drop while Fin-
land and Austria were largely unaffected. In some countries (like Portugal
and Ireland) the index level shows a dramatic recovery post crisis. These
spikes are due to the sudden drop in sample size due to bank failures and are
therefore more notable for small countries having fewer banks.
The volatility of small countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the Nether-
lands and Austria) is relatively high in general. Post 2009, the volatility
dropped for most EMU countries but has not yet returned to its pre-crisis
level. European sovereign debt crisis, loss of market confidence and the
8The country wise bank equity index is based on average logarithmic returns of all
publicly traded banking firms headquartered in a particular country and are normalized
to 100 for all countries at the beginning of the last quarter in 2004. The volatility is
equal weighted annualized equity price volatility based on the standard deviation of daily
logarithmic returns of the previous quarter. This methodology creates an upward (down-
ward) bias in the returns (volatility) indices due to bank failures and should be interpreted
carefully.
9It also indicates strong correlations with the average volatility, which undermines its
effectiveness.
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need for continuous monetary support to banking sector may be explana-
tions for the relatively high average volatility in peripheral countries. Given
the changes in the sample size in a few peripheral countries, the shift in the
mean volatility level needs to be interpreted with caution.
4.2. Equity index vs aDtD during the crisis
To compare the performance of equity indices with aDtD during the
crisis, we analyze the country-wise behavior of market returns with aDtD
during the financial crisis. As a predictive indicator of future health, we
examine the possibility by comparing the cumulative returns from 2007-Q2
and 2008-Q2 to 2009Q1 with the fall in level of aDtD indicator in each
country. Figure 8 summarizes this information aptly. As can be seen, most
of the fall in DtD occurred between 2007-Q2 and 2008-Q2, indicating a direct
obvious prediction of vulnerability prior to the crisis. However, the total drop
in returns shows no correlation with the drop in DtD.
Whether or not the initial level of aDtD matters, we plot the initial level
of aDtD with the drop in aDtD during the crisis (Figure 9) and find a positive
relationship. This suggests that higher initial levels of aDtD experienced
higher corrections during this period. The aDtD for most EMU countries
averaged between 4 to 5 prior to the crisis. During the crisis (between 2007-
Q2 and 2009-Q1), it fell sharply for Austria, France and Italy while for
Portugal, Spain and Greece, the corrections were lower than expected.
[Figure 8 about here.]
[Figure 9 about here.]
4.2.1. Comparison with regulatory risk indicator of bank stress
We examine how country-wise aDtD perform with respect to the Euro-
pean SIFI based aggregate banking risk indicator (ECBDtD) used by the
European Central Bank. To see whether each country’s banking risk indica-
tor has better predictive ability, we plot the countries’ DtDs with ECBDtD
indicator based on large and complex banking institutions. The graphical
evidence (Figure 10) suggests that aDtDs do suggest the deteriorating mar-
ket conditions in most peripheral EMU countries (Spain, Ireland, Greece,
Italy) and some central countries (Germany, Belgium and Finland) prior to
the crisis.
[Figure 10 about here.]
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4.2.2. Association with market sentiments
Here we explore the association of aDtD with a selection of indicators
covering broad market sentiments and sectoral bank indices collected from
independent agencies, professional market data providers and other academic
authors.
• At country level: We consider six variables as proxy for market sen-
timent: a consumer confidence indicator (CCI), stock returns (RET),
the credit rating (RAT), a fiscal stance indicator (FSI), stock volatil-
ity (VOL), rating (RAT) and an index of economic policy uncertainty
(EPU). As for the national bank indices, we examine two sectoral eq-
uities indices covering banks and financial services (Table 4).
Table 5 shows that for the individual countries we find a positive asso-
ciation between aDtD, CCI and RET. In 7 out of 11 cases we detect a
strong connection between our indicator and CCI, while for the RET
we obtain a moderate or strong relationship in 6 out of 11. We also find
a relatively moderate negative association with RAT and EPU and a
strong negative correlation with VOL. For FSI we obtain mixed results.
For the sectoral bank indices, regardless of the DtD indicator, our re-
sults suggest a moderate positive association with both DSBANKS and
DSFIN. The findings suggest that aDtDs are capturing the underlying
trends that generate differences in risk perceptions of national banking
system.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
• At regional (Eurozone) level: Table 6 presents the regional financial in-
dicators we have considered while Table 7 examines the relationship
with aDtDs. As can be noted, we find a strong positive associa-
tion between aDtDs and the regional consumer confidence indicator
(EMUCCI) and a strong negative relationship with regional economic
policy uncertainty (EMUEPU) and regional financial market volatility
(EMUVSTOXX); their associations with the indicator of credit qual-
ity in the EMU corporate market (EMUCREDSPR) and regional fiscal
stance (EMUFSI) are moderate and positive and mix their connection
with regional interest rate volatility (EIRVIX1Y) is mixed. Regarding
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the regional sectoral bank indices, there is evidence of a strong asso-
ciation with national DtDs in most cases. Interestingly, the aDtDs in
the peripheral countries strongly influence all EMU bank indices (both
PIIGS and non-PIIGS), suggesting that the close links between banks
within EMU left them progressively more exposed to the risk of shocks
in other banks.
[Table 6 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
5. Additional information content
An additional dimension of considering comprehensive list of banks for
each country is the increased informational content. To test whether this
has a significant effect, we explore the relationship of our EMU DtDs with
the EMU macroeconomic uncertainty indicators compiled by the European
Central Bank (2013) from a set of diverse sources: (1) measures of uncer-
tainty perceived by economic agents about the future economic situation
based on surveys; (2) measures of uncertainty or of risk aversion based on
financial market indicators; and (3) measures of economic policy uncertainty
(see Table 8). As far as the EMU banking risk measure is concerned, we use
the DtD for large and complex banking groups examined by the European
Central Bank (2012).
Regarding the measures of uncertainty related to future economic out-
comes, we use the degree of disagreement about the projections for activity
between professional forecasters measured as the standard deviation of the
projections from Consensus Economics for annual real GDP growth in the fol-
lowing calendar year (ECBANY), the average “aggregate uncertainty”from
the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (ECBBAVE), combining both
disagreement between forecasters and individual uncertainty, and an indi-
cator capturing the uncertainty of private households (ECBCHOU) and en-
terprises (ECBCBUS) based on the European Commission’s Business and
Consumer Surveys.
To assess financial market uncertainty or risk aversion measures, we use an
average of a set of financial market indicators (implied bond and stock mar-
ket volatility, implied EUR/US dollar volatility and CDS spreads over gov-
ernment bond yields) and a number of systemic stress indicators (exchange
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rate volatility, equity market volatility, bond market volatility, money market
volatility, financial intermediation and a composite systemic stress indicator)
(ECBDAVE).
With respect to economic policy uncertainty, we use an index based on
the newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty and the dis-
agreement between forecasters with regard to the outlook for inflation and
budget balances: These components are aggregated using weights of 50% for
the former and 25% for each of the dispersion measures (ECBEAVE). Addi-
tionally, we make use of an indicator that combines all the individual sets of
series by principal component analysis (ECBFPC). We select these measures
of uncertainty because they show a significant negative correlation with key
macroeconomic variables, such as quarterly growth rates of real GDP, total
investment, private consumption and, in particular, total employment.
[Table 8 about here.]
We compute EMU-aDtD by calculating the simple average of all aDtDs
at the country-level. Table 9 summarizes the correlations of these indicators
with ECB regulatory indicators. As can be seen, we find a significant and
negative association between our indicators of EMU banking systemic risk
based on DtD and the various measures of macroeconomic uncertainty, sug-
gesting that higher banking systemic risk (signalled by a reduction in DtD)
will increase macroeconomic uncertainty and, as a consequence, adversely
affect macroeconomic events.
To test the predictive ability of this indicator with respect to the reg-
ulatory indicators, we assessed the possible existence of Granger-causality.
As can be seen in Table 10, with the sole exception of ECBCHOU, we find
a significant unidirectional Granger-causality relationship running from our
indicators of EMU banking systemic risk to both the various measures of
macroeconomic uncertainty and the banking risk indicator used by the ECB.
This result gives further support to the hypothesized interconnection between
DtDs and macroeconomic uncertainty and banking risk.
[Table 9 about here.]
[Table 10 about here.]
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6. Inter-linkages
To explore the possible causes for the improved performance of country
wise aDtD, we explore the linkages between aDtD using a cross country con-
nectedness measures. We use three ways to measure the connectedness: (1)
Correlations; (2) Granger causality; and (3) Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness
index (DYCI) based on the variance decomposition of forecast errors.
6.1. Correlation measures
To understand the co-movement properties, we use three correlation mea-
sures (parametric: Pearson, and non-parametric: Spearman and Kendell) in
our analysis.10 Since the Pearson measure is the most commonly used, we
report our findings based on Pearson correlations only, but they are also
robust based on other measures.
[Table 11 about here.]
For each measure of correlations, we first estimate the pair-wise corre-
lations between the aDtD (Table 11). As can be seen, we find a strong
correlation11 between indices, which suggests a common risk factor. This
may also be due to the small sample, which contains two crisis episodes. To
understand the time varying correlation dynamics, we tested for correlations
using pre-/post crisis windows and apply a signed rank test to evaluate the
null hypothesis that the mean and median correlations are equal if we divide
the time period in two half (pre and post 2009-Q4).
[Figure 11 about here.]
The results suggest that except Germany and Finland, all other countries
shows very strong correlations with EMU average. This also suggest a com-
mon risk factor which we test in the next section. Belgium, Greece, Italy and
Portugal have strong inter-linkages and connections across the board. Bel-
gian banking sector shows strong connections with all EMU countries except
Germany and the Netherlands. Germany is strongly connected with only
Italy and moderately to France, Austria and Finland. For other peripheral
countries, Germany has weak correlations (Figure 11).
10This avoids any bias arising from potential non-linear dependencies and confirms the
robustness of our findings.
11We use the adjective “strong” when the absolute value of the cross-correlation is above
0.8, “moderate”when it is between 0.7-0.8, and “weak” when it is between 0.6-0.7
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6.2. Granger causality
The graphic behavior of the countries’ aDtD series suggests an underlying
trend. It may be due to an increase in the systemic risk of global financial
industry due to cross linkages, increased volatility or investment in correlated
assets. To understand this spillover within the EMU banking sector, we run
Granger causality tests for each pair-wise country aDtDs. We find very weak
evidence of causality running from a particular country towards the rest of
the countries (Figure 12), which suggests that the banking risk captured by
countries’ aDtDs remains idiosyncratic.
[Figure 12 about here.]
6.3. Diabold-Yilmaz connectedness measure
To explore further the reasons for divergence among aDtD indices, we
use VAR12 based measure of connectedness. The connectedness is based on
the decomposition of the forecast error variance, which is briefly described
here. For a multivariate time series, the forecast error variance decomposition
works as follows:
• First, we fit a standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series;
• Secondly, using series data up to, and including, time t, establish an H
period ahead forecast (up to time t+H); and
• Finally, decompose the forecast error variance for each component with
respect to shocks from the same or other components at time t.
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating process
(DGP) with orthogonal shocks:
xt = Θ(L)ut,Θ(L) = Θ0 + Θ1L+ Θ2L
2 + ..., E(ut, u
′
t) = I
Note that Θ0 need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are
contained in this very general representation. Contemporaneous aspects of
connectedness are summarized in Θ0 and dynamic aspects in Θ1,Θ2, ... Trans-
formation of Θ1,Θ2, ... via variance decompositions in needed to reveal and
compactly summarize connectedness. Let us denote by dHij the ij-th H-step
12Vector auto regression methodologies.
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variance decomposition component (i. e., the fraction of variable i’s H-
step forecast error variance due to shocks in variable j). The connectedness
measures are based on the “non-own”, or “cross”, variance decompositions,
dHij , i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose several connectedness measures built
from pieces of variance decompositions in which the forecast error variance
of variable i is decomposed into parts attributed to the various variables
in the system. Here we provide a snapshot of their connectedness index.
They proposed a connectedness table such as Table 12 to understand the
various connectedness measures and their relationships. Its main upper-left
NxN block, that contains the variance decompositions, is called the “variance
decomposition matrix,” and is denoted it by DH = [dij] The connectedness
table augments DH with a rightmost column containing row sums, a bottom
row containing column sums, and a bottom-right element containing the
grand average, in all cases for i 6= j.
[Table 12 about here.]
The off-diagonal entries of DH are the parts of the N forecast-error vari-
ance decompositions of relevance from a connectedness perspective. In par-





Since in general CHi←j 6= CHj←i the net pairwise directional connectedness




Regarding the off-diagonal row sums in Table 12, they give the share of
the H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi coming from shocks arising
in other variables (all other, as opposed to a single other), while the off-
diagonal column sums provide the share of the H-step forecast-error variance
of variable xi going to shocks arising in other variables. Hence, the off-
diagonal row and column sums, labeled “from” and “to” in the connectedness
table, offer the total directional connectedness measures. In particular, total















Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently,







For the case of non-orthogonal shocks the variance decompositions are
not easily calculated as before because the variance of a weighted sum is not
an appropriate sum of variances; in this case methodologies for providing
orthogonal innovations like traditional Cholesky-factor identification may be
sensitive to ordering. So, following Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), a general-
ized VAR decomposition (GVD), invariant to ordering, proposed by Koop
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) will be employed. The H-step
















In this case, ej is a vector with j
th element unity and zeros elsewhere,
Θh is the coefficient matrix in the infinite moving-average representation
from VAR,
∑
is the covariance matrix of the shock vector in the non-
orthogonalized-VAR, σij being its j
th diagonal element. In this GVD frame-
work, the lack of orthogonality makes it so that the rows of do not have sum
unity and, in order to get a generalized connectedness index D˜g = [d˜gij], the
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, where by construction∑N
j=1 d˜
g





The matrix D˜g = [d˜gij] permits us to define similar concepts as defined
before for the orthogonal case, that is, total directional connectedness, net
total directional connectedness and total connectedness.
Table 13-14 shows the net connectedness of aDtD based on 6 months
and 1 year horizon while Figure 13 shows the highest connectedness based
on the top three deciles (black, red and orange respectively). As can be seen,
the Netherlands shows very weak connectedness while Germany and Italy
shows linkages only with Finland and Portugal respectively. Spain, Belgium,
Portugal and Austria have high connectedness with most EMU countries
except the Netherlands, Italy and Germany. Even for changing horizon, the
results remain quite consistent. In most cases, the effects seem to dry out
but the connectedness pair remain the same. Finally, we observe a value of
73.67% for the total connectedness between aDtD in a horizon of 6 months
and value 76.72% for a year, in line with the values of 78.3% obtained by
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for US financial institutions.
[Table 13 about here.]
[Table 14 about here.]
[Figure 13 about here.]
7. Conclusion
By analyzing the behavior and fluctuations of a market based banking
risk indicator for individual EMU countries, we find that aDtD is an intu-
itive, simple and convenient forward looking risk measure. It shows some
predictive ability 12-18 months prior to the crisis for most of the peripheral
EMU countries and captures trends as well as fluctuations in the financial
markets. However its sensitivity to volatility also generates strong correla-
tions with quarterly average historical volatility.
The level of aDtD varies with country suggesting cross-sectional struc-
tural differences across the banking sector. The country-level aDtD indica-
tors shows strong co-movements across countries but the test for a systemic
component reveals negative results. Analysis of the crisis period suggest
that the initial level of aDtD matters but that the change in aDtD is more
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pronounced for countries with a higher initial level. The correlations analy-
sis suggests inter-linkage across country banking stress but low inter-linkage
between core and peripheral EMU countries.
When compared with risk measures, average EMU DtDs shows better pre-
dictive ability together with very high correlations with market uncertainty
and sentiment measures. The Granger causality test reveals the direction of
causality running from EMU DtD to Eurozone risk indicators (and not the
other way round) suggesting better information content. The strong asso-
ciation between aDtDs and regional (Eurozone) market sentiment/sectoral
banking indices shows better explanatory power.
Our results may be beneficial to policymakers since, given the current
structure of financial markets and market regulations, it makes sense to track
systemic risk indicators at the national level. Following the systemic risk
indicators based on large, complex EU-wide financial institution may delay
the prediction of risk buildup.
To conclude, there are various reasons for considering country-wise risk
indicators alongside regional market and other risk measures. As the statisti-
cal theory suggests, when faced with two estimators for the same underlying
variable, it is optimal to combine the two. Tracking country specific indices
provide additional information related to the average risk level and their
ability to forecast the risk buildup cannot be ignored.
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Table 1: Description of variables
Balance sheet variables Source
Total assets As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope
(Code 2025)
Short-term liabilities Deposits and short term funding Bankscope
(Code 2030)
Total equity As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope
(Code 2055)
Daily market based variables
Risk-free interest rate Benchmark 10Y bond yield of country
where the bank headquarter is based
Thomson
Datastream
Market capitalization Daily closing share price multiplied by
total outstanding share in public
Thomson
Datastream
Table 2 List of banks (by country)
Name Status ISIN
Austria (AT)
UniCredit Bank Austria AG Delisted AT0000995006
Erste Group Bank AG Listed AT0000652011
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Listed AT0000606306
Belgium (BE)
Dexia Listed BE0003796134
KBC Groep NV Listed BE0003565737
Germany (DE)
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG Delisted DE0008023227
Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG Delisted DE0008076001
UniCredit Bank AG Delisted DE0008022005
Oldenburgische Landesbank Listed DE0008086000
Deutsche Postbank AG Listed DE0008001009
UmweltBank AG Listed DE0005570808
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG Delisted DE0008027707
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG Listed DE0008115106
Deutsche Bank AG Listed DE0005140008
Commerzbank AG Listed DE000CBK1001
Wustenrot & Wurttembergische Listed DE0008051004
Continued on next page
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Name Status ISIN
Comdirect Bank AG Listed DE0005428007
Net-M Privatbank 1891 AG Delisted DE0008013400
Merkur-Bank KGaA Listed DE0008148206
Quirin Bank AG Listed DE0005202303
Spain (ES)
Banco Santander SA Listed ES0113900J37
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Listed ES0113211835
Caixabank, S.A. Listed ES0140609019
Bankia, SA Listed ES0113307021
Banco de Sabadell SA Listed ES0113860A34
Banco Popular Espanol SA Listed ES0113790226
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo CAM Listed ES0114400007
Bankinter SA Listed ES0113679I37
Renta 4 Banco, S.A. Listed ES0173358039
Finland (FI)
Pohjola Bank Plc Listed FI0009003222
Aktia Bank Plc Listed FI4000058870
Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland Plc Listed FI0009001127
France (FR)
Credit Agricole Sud Rhone Alpes Listed FR0000045346
Paris Orleans SA Listed FR0000031684
Credit Agricole de la Touraine et du Poitou Listed FR0000045304
Credit Agricole Alpes Provence Listed FR0000044323
Credit Agricole Nord de France Listed FR0000185514
Credit Agricole d’Ile-de-France Listed FR0000045528
Credit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire Listed FR0000045239
Credit Industriel et Commercial Listed FR0005025004
Banque Tarneaud Delisted FR0000065526
Credit agricole mutuel de Normandie-Seine Listed FR0000044364
Credit Agricole Mutuel du Languedoc Listed FR0010461053
Natixis Listed FR0000120685
Credit Agricole de l’Ille-et-Vilaine Listed FR0000045213
Credit Agricole d’Aquitaine Delisted FR0000044547
Continued on next page
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Name Status ISIN
Societe Generale Listed FR0000130809
Credit Agricole S.A. Listed FR0000045072
BNP Paribas Listed FR0000131104
Boursorama Listed FR0000075228
Credit Agricole du Morbihan Listed FR0000045551
Credit Agricole Brie Picardie Listed FR0010483768




National Bank of Greece SA Listed GRS003003019
Piraeus Bank SA Listed GRS014003008
Eurobank Ergasias SA Listed GRS323003004
Alpha Bank AE Listed GRS015013006
Marfin Investment Group Listed GRS314003005
Attica Bank SA-Bank of Attica SA Listed GRS001003003
General Bank of Greece SA Listed GRS002003010
Ireland (IE)
Depfa Bank Plc Delisted IE0072559994
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited-
IBRC
Delisted IE00B06H8J93
Permanent TSB Plc Delisted IE0004678656
Bank of Ireland Listed IE0030606259
Allied Irish Banks plc Listed IE0000197834
Italy (IT)
UniCredit SpA Listed IT0004781412
Intesa Sanpaolo Listed IT0000072618
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Listed IT0001334587
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa Listed IT0003487029
Banco Popolare - Societa Coop. Listed IT0004231566
Mediobanca SpA Listed IT0000062957
Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna Listed IT0000066123
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL Listed IT0000064482
Banca Carige SpA Listed IT0003211601
Continued on next page
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Name Status ISIN
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Coop.
per Azioni
Listed IT0000784196
Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM Listed IT0003121677
Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop Listed IT0000064516
Banca popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio Soc.
coop.
Listed IT0004919327
Credito Bergamasco Listed IT0000064359
Banco di Sardegna SpA Listed IT0001005070
Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA Listed IT0001041000
Banca Ifis SpA Listed IT0003188064
Banca Generali SpA Listed IT0001031084
Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Ges-
tioni
Listed IT0000074077
Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA Listed IT0001007209
Banca Profilo SpA Listed IT0001073045
Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA Listed IT0000088853
The Netherlands (NL)
SNS Reaal NV Delisted NL0000390706
RBS Holdings NV Delisted NL0000301109
ING Groep NV Listed NL0000303600
Delta Lloyd NV-Delta Lloyd Group Listed NL0009294552
Van Lanschot NV Listed NL0000302636
BinckBank NV Listed NL0000335578
Portugal (PT)
Montepio Holding SGPS SA Delisted PTFNB0AM0005
Banco Comercial Portugues, SA Listed PTBCP0AM0007
Banco Espirito Santo SA Listed PTBES0AM0007
Banco BPI SA Listed PTBPI0AM0004




Table 3: Summary statistics - aDtD
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union.
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
AT 0.78 2.00 2.90 2.98 3.97 5.59
BE 0.69 1.53 2.46 3.25 4.59 8.23
ES 2.00 3.07 4.42 4.58 5.54 8.50
DE 1.31 3.14 3.89 3.80 4.38 6.42
FI 1.80 3.35 3.88 4.34 5.42 8.68
FR 2.27 3.33 4.71 4.63 5.67 7.05
GR 0.81 1.38 1.87 2.35 3.40 5.28
IE 0.49 1.15 1.75 2.69 4.51 7.50
IT 1.97 2.87 3.89 4.20 5.57 7.72
NL 1.49 2.74 3.98 3.83 4.77 6.40
PT 1.45 2.23 3.21 3.96 5.32 9.58
EMU 1.52 2.59 3.49 3.69 4.81 6.32





This index is built up by the European Com-
mission which conducts regular harmonized




Stock Returns (RET) Differences between logged stock indices prices
of the last and the first day of the quarter for
each country.
Datastream
Rating (RAT) Credit rating scale built up from Fitch,
Moodys, S&P ratings for each country. Fol-
lowing Blanco (2001), we built up a quarterly
scale to estimate the effect of investor senti-
ment based on the rating offered by these three
rating agencies.
Bloomberg
Index of Fiscal Stance
(FSI)
This indicator compares a target level of the
debt-GDP ratio at a given point in the fu-
ture with a forecast based on the government




Stock Volatility (VOL) Quarterly average of monthly standard devia-
tion of the daily returns of each country’s stock
market general index
Datastream
Index of Economic Policy
Uncertainty (EPU)
This index draws on the frequency of news-
paper references to policy uncertainty; it was
built for Germany, France, Italy, Spain and




DSBANKS DataStream Equity Index-Banks DataStream
DSFIN DataStream Equity Index-Financial Services DataStream
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Table 5: Correlations between aDtDs and national financial indicators
aDtD
Market sentiment indicators Sectoral bank indices
CCI RET RAT FSI VOL EPU DSBANKS DSFIN
AT 0.87 0.08 - -0.55 -0.86 - 0.70 0.49
BE 0.80 -0.03 -0.34 -0.64 -0.94 - 0.58 0.90
DE 0.71 0.40 - -0.83 -0.92 -0.51 0.44 0.53
ES 0.58 -0.03 0.22 -0.31 -0.69 -0.30 0.49 0.29
FI 0.53 0.05 - 0.17 -0.88 - 0.31 -
FR 0.76 0.56 -0.10 -0.64 -0.94 - 0.47 0.90
GR 0.79 0.67 -0.60 0.65 -0.88 - 0.81 0.41
IE 0.87 0.75 -0.58 0.87 -0.83 - 0.82 0.24
IT 0.68 0.53 -0.61 0.04 -0.92 -0.64 0.60 0.66
NL 0.59 0.51 - 0.35 -0.87 - 0.70 0.66
PT 0.24 0.06 -0.34 -0.36 -0.95 - 0.21 0.23
Table 6: Regional financial indicators
Market sentiment indicators
Variable Description Source




EMUCREDSPR Difference between the yields of the iBoxx indices con-
taining BBB-rated European corporate bonds against the
yields of the respective iBoxx indices of AAA-rated Euro-
pean corporate bonds.
Datastream
EMUEPU This index draws on the frequency of newspaper references
to policy uncertainty; it was built for Germany, France,




EMUFSI Index of Fiscal stance, based on comparing a target level
of the debt-GDP ratio at a given point in the future with
a forecast based on the government budget constraint. It




EIRVIX1Y 1-year interest rate volatility index for the Eurozone based
on the implied volatility quotes of caps (floors). This index





EMUVSTOXX Eurostoxx-50 implied stock market volatility index www.stoxx.com
Sectoral bank indices
Variable Description Source
EUROSTOXX Europe Total Market Banks Datastream
EMUBANKS EMU Banks Datastream
EMUPIIGSBANKS PIIGS Banks Datastream















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Regulatory indicators
Macroeconomic uncertainty indicators
Variable Explaination Based on
ECBANY Disagreement about the projections for annual
GDP growth at the following year
Consensus Economics
ECBBAVE Average uncertainty over GDP, HICP and un-
employment over four time horizons (current
year, one year ahead, two years ahead and long
term)
ECB’s Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters





ECBCBUS Heterogeneity of responses by enterprises European Commission’s
Business and Consumer
Surveys
ECBDAVE Average of a set of financial market indicators
and systemic stress indicators
ECB financial market
database
ECBEAVE Economic policy uncertainty indicator Baker, Bloom and Davis
(2013)
ECBFPC Summary measure of economic, financial mar-
ket and economic policy uncertainty
ECB staff calculations.
Banking risk indicators
Variable Explaination Based on
ECBEMUDD Aggregate DtD for large and complex EMU
banking groups
ECB staff and Moody’s
KMV calculation


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Correlations among aggregate DtD indices
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union
aDtD
AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EMU
AT 1.00 0.83 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.88 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.79 0.77 0.91
BE 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.66 0.63 0.83 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.95
ES 0.70 0.83 1.00 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.72 0.86 0.75 0.65 0.73 0.87
DE 0.79 0.66 0.65 1.00 0.78 0.75 0.51 0.62 0.81 0.69 0.58 0.80
FI 0.71 0.63 0.66 0.78 1.00 0.62 0.53 0.63 0.74 0.65 0.58 0.77
FR 0.88 0.83 0.67 0.75 0.62 1.00 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.72 0.70 0.86
GR 0.74 0.89 0.72 0.51 0.53 0.69 1.00 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.88 0.88
IE 0.78 0.93 0.86 0.62 0.63 0.74 0.84 1.00 0.78 0.71 0.77 0.92
IT 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.78 1.00 0.80 0.84 0.93
NL 0.79 0.79 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.71 0.80 1.00 0.67 0.85
PT 0.77 0.84 0.73 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.88 0.77 0.84 0.67 1.00 0.88
EMU 0.91 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.88 1.00
Table 12: Schematic connectedness table
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i, j = 1NdHiN
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Table 13: Connectedness among country-wise banking risk - aDtD and Horizon 6 months
Country AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EMU From
AT 19.35 3.76 1.30 4.95 22.30 5.47 5.09 4.76 3.66 3.77 13.15 12.42 80.65
BE 6.50 7.58 5.72 5.94 18.18 4.45 9.81 3.30 6.00 3.43 17.13 11.95 92.42
ES 5.59 4.14 16.78 3.52 13.77 4.51 9.09 4.65 10.14 6.01 10.00 11.81 83.22
DE 8.22 2.54 1.63 38.97 14.19 9.51 7.12 5.48 5.62 1.10 0.58 5.04 61.03
FI 12.77 3.57 2.39 5.72 33.04 4.54 3.97 3.85 8.15 3.12 6.18 12.70 66.96
FR 10.20 3.38 1.45 14.28 14.95 27.47 4.37 5.41 2.82 5.33 2.23 8.13 72.53
GR 4.77 3.91 3.79 6.58 6.77 2.98 28.52 1.55 4.13 5.19 24.74 7.07 71.48
IE 13.42 3.84 2.88 10.71 15.96 10.95 2.69 15.06 5.18 4.38 6.67 8.26 84.94
IT 4.68 4.89 6.76 5.43 10.28 2.28 3.99 2.23 20.16 6.21 18.98 14.12 79.84
NL 5.45 2.85 3.12 1.57 6.95 6.14 5.22 0.85 9.37 42.32 5.39 10.77 57.68
PT 4.85 4.40 4.16 4.80 4.54 1.20 4.56 0.96 6.52 2.50 51.65 9.87 48.35
EMU 9.04 5.51 4.74 4.39 16.52 4.93 5.07 3.31 9.44 6.35 15.66 15.06 84.94
To 81.54 84.95 69.34 63.54 81.38 67.47 68.13 70.70 77.89 52.83 70.03 88.16 73.67
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Table 14: Connectedness among country-wise banking risk - aDtD and Horizon 1 year
Country AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EMU From
AT 18.15 3.91 1.66 4.70 21.34 4.67 5.87 4.35 4.50 4.31 13.71 12.84 81.85
BE 7.34 7.68 3.98 5.09 17.00 3.34 10.12 3.31 7.00 4.04 17.14 13.96 92.32
ES 6.81 5.37 9.81 2.66 16.15 2.85 12.03 3.66 9.14 8.12 10.93 12.47 90.19
DE 6.68 3.71 1.74 32.04 12.82 6.68 9.46 3.96 7.22 1.49 6.52 7.67 67.96
FI 12.47 3.73 2.03 5.48 30.61 4.47 4.93 4.27 8.81 3.26 6.20 13.74 69.39
FR 8.19 4.71 1.86 11.02 13.89 19.95 6.14 3.34 4.14 6.11 9.12 11.54 80.05
GR 7.71 3.86 1.51 7.18 8.71 2.77 29.04 3.02 1.87 5.57 23.03 5.71 70.96
IE 13.90 5.12 2.28 9.76 18.35 5.00 5.47 11.37 4.77 3.64 10.50 9.85 88.63
IT 6.26 5.65 4.54 7.11 14.99 2.93 5.36 2.36 16.47 5.78 16.10 12.44 83.53
NL 7.42 3.69 2.25 2.44 7.74 8.80 7.81 1.43 6.69 38.76 3.28 9.66 61.24
PT 5.80 4.87 2.54 6.51 6.13 2.16 5.46 1.19 3.82 2.83 50.67 8.01 49.33
EMU 10.17 6.07 3.17 4.91 17.69 4.76 6.60 3.19 7.70 5.49 15.45 14.82 85.18
To 83.64 86.85 73.75 67.61 83.49 70.83 73.18 74.98 79.95 56.64 72.26 88.83 76.72
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Figure 1: Size distribution of banks in individual countries
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IR: Ireland,
IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal. Datasource: Bankscope.





















































































Figure 2: MFI total assets as multiple of GDP
MFI: Monetary Financial Institution as classified by Organization for International Co-operation and













Total banking assets (as multiple of GDP (in 2008))
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Figure 3: Banks’ holding of their own sovereign bonds in notional terms (as % of total
notional outstanding)
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Figure 4: No of banks used every period for each country
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IR: Ireland,
IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal. Datasource: Bankscope.

































Figure 5: ISO-DtD curves
The figure shows simulated iso-DtD curves for nine different values of DtD with respect to leverage and
equity volatility. One can clearly see that DtD is much more sensitive to equity volatility than the
leverage even at low levels.

































Figure 6: Average DtD
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union.












AT BE ES DE FI FR
GR IE IT NL PT EMU
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Figure 7: Country-wise indices
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union. The
blue, green and red line represent volatility, aDtD and equity index level respectively.





























































































































































































































































Figure 8: Cumulative returns vs DtD
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,












































































































Figure 9: Scatter plot with trend line (2007-Q2 to 2009-Q1)
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,















































Figure 10: National DtD vs ECB DtD
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,










































































































































































































































Figure 11: Correlations among aDtDs
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,









































Figure 12: Linkages based on Granger causality tests
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union. Red













Figure 13: Net directional connectedness among aDtDs
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland,
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union. Black,


























(b) Horizon 1 year
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